Malicious Insider Risk Calculator

Example data table

Insider threat impact surfaces and typical loss patterns

Malicious insider events usually concentrate on three loss surfaces: data theft, sabotage, and fraud. Data theft is often signaled by unusual repository cloning, bulk exports, or repeated access to “need-to-know” folders. Sabotage commonly appears as risky configuration changes, disabled logging, or service degradation following privilege escalation. Fraud tends to correlate with finance or procurement access and unusually timed approvals. Tracking these surfaces helps align your input ratings with observable activity. It helps separate capability from opportunity across environments.

How weighted drivers translate into comparable risk scores

The driver score normalizes each factor to a shared scale, then applies weights so higher-impact indicators influence the result more. Privilege, critical access, and anomaly alerts receive strong weight because they expand capability and reduce detection time. Remote work share, notice period, and third-party access raise exposure by increasing oversight complexity and turnover volatility. Using consistent weightings across teams improves comparability between cases and reduces bias.

Control strength assumptions behind mitigation deductions

Mitigation points represent how quickly misuse can be detected and contained. Higher monitoring maturity implies centralized telemetry, baselines, and tested response playbooks. Training recency reduces mistakes and increases reporting, especially for sensitive data handling. MFA and least-privilege reduce common insider paths such as credential sharing, persistent admin rights, and lateral movement through overbroad group memberships. When controls are partial, score them conservatively. Confirm alerts reach responders fast, and stale access is removed on schedule.

Operational thresholds for triage and escalation timing

Risk levels are intended to guide response urgency, not label individuals. Low and Moderate results fit routine governance: periodic access reviews and targeted tuning. High results justify rapid triage, short-lived privilege tightening, and structured case notes. Critical results should be handled with incident discipline: evidence preservation, coordinated legal and HR engagement, and documented approvals for containment actions. Always validate scores with case context.

Using exports for audit trails and continuous improvement

CSV and PDF exports support repeatable reporting and post-incident learning. Store exported results with timestamps, the evidence used for each rating, and any control changes applied afterward. Over time, compare driver patterns with confirmed outcomes to refine scoring guidance, tune alerting, and improve offboarding checklists. Treat updates as governance changes, and keep prior versions to preserve historical comparability. Pair trends with detection time, access revocation time, and offboarding completion rates. Use results to prioritize fixes, then measure improvements quarterly.

FAQs

1) Does a high score prove malicious intent?

No. The score estimates exposure based on access, signals, and controls. Use it to prioritize investigation steps, and rely on validated evidence and policy processes for conclusions.

2) What evidence should drive the “anomaly alerts” rating?

Use confirmed telemetry such as unusual downloads, atypical login locations, mass permission changes, or data movement beyond role norms. Avoid ratings based on rumor or unverified reports.

3) How often should we re-run the assessment?

Reassess after material changes: privilege updates, new alerts, role transitions, contractor renewals, or control improvements. For active cases, re-run after each triage milestone.

4) Should we adjust the default weights?

Only with governance approval. Weight changes affect comparability across time and teams. If you must tune, document rationale, the new weights, and the effective date in your risk register.

5) How should “external pressure indicators” be handled responsibly?

Use documented, job-relevant indicators and minimize sensitive personal details. Apply least-privilege access to case notes and involve HR/legal per policy before taking actions.

6) What’s a practical first step when the result is Critical?

Start with containment that preserves business continuity: restrict high-risk privileges temporarily, increase monitoring, and begin evidence preservation. Coordinate decisions with incident response, HR, and legal.